

# Recognizing European Union's Renewed Security Engagement in Africa: A Case Study of North African States, from the Post Arab Spring Period to 2018

MATTHEW BOADIE - AMPONG

Department of Public Policy

National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

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**Abstract:** The issue of securitization of the European community has consistently and significantly been a major concern of the European Union. However, since no geopolitical space can be considered as an island, there is the need for a supranational institution like the European Union to safeguard the interest of its sovereign member states by consolidating itself with the security issues of neighbouring non-European states. The reason being that most of the European states, as well as the European Union has some profitable engagement with these neighbours specifically the North African states. Since the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the European Union has developed a new mechanism in addressing security issues in the North African states. This research therefore looked at the non-militarization policy design employed by the European Union to promote political, economic and social security in North Africa. The study made use of expert in-depth interviews and relevant quantitative secondary sources to arrive at its findings. It was realised in the study that the European Union has significantly contributed to the political transformation in Tunisia, economic liberation in Morocco and enhanced social wellbeing in Algeria. There is no single North African state who has fully developed in all the European securitization processes. A country like Libya has been crawling in all these areas due to its statelessness. Egypt, in this case, has also not shown much progress due to its indecision to subscribe to the concept of Europeanization and the auxiliary prescriptions it comes with in the Egyptian sovereign geopolitical space.

**Keywords:** European Union, Political Security, Economic Security, Social Security, North Africa, Official Development Assistant, Money, Mobility, Market.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The issues of security have always been priorities among regional and state actors since post world war two period. Many states within a particular geographical reality often times join hands to promote and secure their own internal and external interest by securitizing their regional space from any external and domestic unstableness. However, since no region is an island and therefore the need to rely on each other to ensure a conducive atmosphere for the continuity of political, social and economic activities, regional actors dialogue with each other for their own common good. This is not exception from the regional relationship between European Union and the African Union. By this, as Haastrup [1] asserted, countries in the European space together with their relevant bureaucratic institutions specifically the European Union are now sorting to a newly dynamic engagement with the various political institutions both at the state and regional level in Africa. For instance, European states and institutions over the years, magnificently relate with the North African states due to their geographical closeness and historicity with the Eastern Europe states. That is, the geographical intimacy between North Africa and Eastern European corridor marks the development of the longstanding relationship in the Mediterranean region.

Furthermore, the regional connectivity between Europe and the Mediterranean is being characterised by some level of historical and geographical responsiveness. And it should be understood, that the regionalization of the Mediterranean space cannot be emphasized without taking into consideration countries of the northern section of Africa since they form part of the true origination of the Mediterranean territoriality. In relation to such a connectivity between the two aforementioned regions, has led to an influx of migrants to the European space based on a number of reasons. According to Moussis [2], the mountainous number of migrants to the European Union can be traced to some countries from the Mediterranean and they include Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia. This is as a result of the longevity of the relationship that exist between the European Union and such North African countries. This relationship can be dated back to the days of the European Economic Community (EEC) where the community through its policy actors were able to find a common engagement platforms with the Mediterranean region. Such platforms led to the adoption of policies such as the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of 1972, the 1990 Euro – Mediterranean Partnership stretching to the unification of the Mediterranean space into the European Union in the year 2007, which was proposed by the French President Nicholas Sarkozy.

Discursively, the above mentioned policy partnership has undergone a series of evolutionary policy regime and diversity in the European Union (EU) – Mediterranean engagement over the past few decades. Commencing from the 1980s, a number of sovereign states who were partners of the Global Mediterranean Policy such as the Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS) joined the evolution of the EEC to European Community (EC) and became member states of the EC. The continuous EU – Mediterranean engagement experience a new partnership shift in 1995 when the European Union tossed a new EU – Mediterranean partnership popularly known as the Barcelona Process. This made the Balkanized countries (who basically had a composition of the former Yugoslavia and were regarded as Mediterranean members) to have a new European phase where they were recognized as part of the Eastern European States. This gave the Balkan countries the privilege to be part of the broader European Neighbourhood Policy. The Barcelona Process also, allowed for the inclusiveness of all North African countries (since they are part of the Mediterranean region), based on their own respected free sovereign will, to be part of the EU, except Libya. Libya, by then, was undergoing and facing sanctions from the United Nations (UN). Libya was made an exclusionist from the Barcelona Process because of the dictatorial regime under the supreme leadership of the late Muammar Gadhafi. The integration of the northern space of Africa into the EU was to ensure a common pursuit of welfare of which the securitization of the North African region was accentuated. Despite the absence of Libya from the Barcelona Process, the disengagement of Libya from European partnerships and relations was not mutually exclusive from the European member countries. For example; Italy, being a colonial master of Libya, has over the years exhibited a major interest in Libya. This interest was manifested in the cordial relation that existed between Berlusconi and Gadhafi. Also, commencing from 2003 onwards, many European countries expanded its already existing relations with Libya, which transcended oil trading to the securitization of Libya.

However, the December 17, 2010 self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in the public space as a result of unfavourable living conditions and lifestyle, sparked a territorial spread of public unrest. Starting from Tunisia and progressing to neighbouring countries like Egypt and Libya, and has contributed to a pocket public unrest in the Middle Eastern countries like Yemen, Syria and some other Arab world. This unrest together with a number of popular protests that occurred in the aftermath of the Arab spring has led to the overthrow of some longstanding political regimes in North Africa. References can be made to the case of the former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the famous Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. However, it should be noted that protest against political regimes is still ongoing in countries like Syria and Yemen. Currently, there is no evidence of the atrocities in Syria and Yemen coming to an end but the likelihood of continuous blood flow is what can be projected now. The EU is currently struggling to respond to the development of this complex historical mystery of Arab spring which poses a critical threat to the European security due to the time-honoured partnership between both regions. By this, it has erupted a dilemma in the current EU security policies towards these Arable geographical space. This was not long ago, articulated by President of the European Council (EC) - Herman Van Rompuy, who said that “it was a difficult choice between defending our values such as human rights and our interests, such as stability in the Middle East” [3], [4]. To provide a better insight into this quandary, this research is to identify the impact of the EU’s securitization processes towards the states in North Africa in the aftermath of Arab Spring spill over effect.

## 2. SUMMARIZING THE SECURITY INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE FROM ABERYSTWYTH NORMATIVE TO THE COPENHAGEN ANALYSIS

Over the years, there has been a bifurcation of security models that are metaphorically coined by different school of thoughts based on the exact geographical space it was developed. These models include the Aberystwyth School (from the land of Wales) and the Copenhagen School (from Denmark). Each school has its own proposition that intellectually contest in various academic communities such as International Relations, Political Sciences, Public Policy, Security Studies and Sociology. Different scholarships cross-pollinate these contestable positions when debating on the security of the European public sphere. Since securitization and protectionism are an integral part of the European Union's mission statement (that is, member states of the union are to be internally and externally secured from any form of direct or indirect threat to sustain the anti-aggressive European comfort). This research therefore seeks to review the security contestations developed as a paradigm by the aforementioned schools of the European space and how these paradigms are shifted from theory to practice by the European Union. It is a discourse based summary of these two school's proposition on security. Other schools are existing but are not taking into consideration for the purpose of this study. And here the word discourse has narrowly been operationalized using the definitive understanding of Howarth and Stavrakakis as "System of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects" [5].

According to Wæver [6], the key mechanism to the understanding of security in the European space can be discussed by the very paradigms and its rationale for development which postulate the intellectual thinking and understanding of each school of thought. Drawing from the Aberystwyth contention, Booth and Jones made a critical examination on security especially from the American perspective which is basically a realist scholarships argument where the military terrorizations to a state is narrowly recognized as the security issue. Booth and Jones challenge this American realist understanding by arguing beyond the confinement of the militarization. They connect security studies to the enlargement of human freedom and liberation. That is to say, the European citizens are secured when they have the free will and liberal power to engage in their political, economic and social affairs without any counter reaction. By this, the Aberystwyth normative proposition to security "questions the primacy of state security and seeks to ascertain the conditions for achieving individual security from the broader threat of poverty, political oppression, and environmental degradation, as well as violence and conflict" [7].

This school was built from the massive inspiration derived from the tradition of the Gramscian and Frankfurt School [8] which differentiate between the critical aspect of security theory and problem-answering oriented aspect of security theory studies. With respect to the critical perspective of the security theory studies, it "stands apart from the prevailing order and asks how that order came about", problem-solving theory is content with fixing glitches so as to make 'existing relationships and institutions work smoothly' [9]. This often make scholars to assume and believe that the critical approach to security studies is just to make some constructive critiques, hence the paradigm is utopian in its very understanding. Cox and other scholars such as Booth believe that this intellectual thinking about the critical theory of security studies (which forms the foundation of the Aberystwyth thinking) is a miscalculation. The reason being that, the critical theory do embrace and recognizes problem orientations by holding on to the historical normative that made them happen. It also suggest some policy alternative to transform the existing circumstances [9], [10]. This by default, requires a key actor centric intervention to ensure order by creating institutional structures responsible for finding answers that transcend beyond the borders of problem solving within the very confinement of the prevailing order [11].

In contradistinction, the Copenhagen School analysed how the concept of security affect specific issues. To them "Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" [12]. The school conceptualizes security as a threat that is socially constructed with specific actors often recognised by the public as the political champions or elites who has the authority to declare events or situations as a threat to state or national security. Once these social events or situations are accepted and recognized by the public as a threat to the social safety, it gives the political actors the legitimate authority to exercise their powers within a particular measureable mechanism to counter react the threat in question [12]. By this, the Copenhagen scholars see the concept of security as instrument for developing new analytical mechanism in the study of security. So Šulović [13], argued in the long run, that the basic understanding of the Copenhagen school of thought lies on security as an assumption constructed by some social occurrences as threat but these claims do not exist autonomously from the traditional security discourse which marks the foundation of security studies as such. This paradigm emphasises on the end results or effect of the security concept, especially in non-militarization discourse.

The theories of security have been disintegrated and conceptualised in many forms to reach specified measurable indicators. Other intellectual debates have also been created on the concept of security with the aim of addressing real life problems. These as discussed above, gives both academicians and policy makers the ground level and deep understanding on how security concerns are dealt with from different perspectives. However, research has given little attention to how security issues has been operationalized as a threat to the bilateral politics, economics and social engagement between an institutional actor like the EU and other autonomous states such as the North African states. This study therefore takes that as a lacuna and addresses the EU relations with the North Africa in that respect.

### 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1. Methods of Data Collection

The research is based on qualitative and quantitative techniques as its main methods of collecting data. It was carried out using both secondary and primary data sources. With the secondary source, data was sourced from publications and reports, books, articles, seminars papers, journals and electronic media report from both governmental and non-governmental organizations. Also, statistical data report from governmental and non-governmental organizations was used to analyse the significant effect of the EU renewed surety engagement in North Africa. The relevant institutions where secondary data, which is statistical in nature, was retrieved from include the European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS), Freedom House Database, Heritage Foundation Database of Washington and the Social Progress Database.

With the primary source, expert interviews were employed as a data source since this was a crucial case study type among the North African states. It was a Skype interview that lasted for approximately forty (40) minutes each per interviewee. In the interviewing, a semi-structured format was used in order to solicit an in-depth information necessary to the topic from interviewees who were basically experts in EU - North African relations especially in the context of security. Due to busy schedules and difficulties in reaching the experts for this research, the research employed convenient sampling and purposive sampling technique. With this, experts readily accessible and knowledgeable in the aforementioned research topic were interviewed to make progress with the research.

#### 3.2. Data Analysis Method

The research used both qualitative and quantitative data analysis method. With the qualitative method, data were collected from relevant documents and statements already posited by scholars and authority on the field of the study to support the argumentation provided in the expert interview that was conducted. The research also made use of the NVivo to transcribe all information given by the interviewees. The research also categorized the different level of response in the process of generating meaning from the transcribed data, ranging from broad groupings, then identifying the finer aspect of data, and sorting them into more specified categories. Also, the statements expressed by interviewees in the interviews was used to connote the normal recognizable way of making a logical analysis of the data. With the quantitative method, secondary data was retrieved were analysed with the use of excel to make graphical representations.

#### 3.3. Ethical Consideration


Experts who were purposively and conveniently interviewed were made aware of the relevance of the research. They were also assured with confidentiality of their responses to the various questions asked in the interview process. Also expert's attention was drawn to the fact that they are free not to be answerable to questions that they are unwilling to comment on. These helped in gaining the informed consent of the various experts for the conduction of the interview.

### 4. EU SECURITIZATION PROCESS THROUGH THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANT (ODA) AND MONEY- MOBILITY - MARKET (3MS).

This section focuses on the various mechanism put in place to ensure political security, economic security and social security in the North of Africa by the European Union. The mechanisms are of two folds namely: the securitization process through the Official Development Assistant (ODA) and the securitization process through the Money, Mobility and Market (also known as the 3Ms). The chapter discusses how the European Union applied the ODA and 3Ms in the North African countries.

#### 4.1. The Official Development Assistant (ODA)

The ODA project has been used by the European Union as one of its technicalities to promote security in the North African region from 2010 onwards. As its name implies, it is a development assistant given to countries who are less developed to rise in their development agendas. The European rationale behind the provision of the assistant to neighbouring North African states is described in figure one (1):



**Fig. 1. The Rationale behind the EU's Official Development Assistant to the North Africans**

Note: PS = Political Security, ES = Economic Security and SS = Social Security

#### 4.2. The Money- Mobility - Market (3Ms)

The EU on 25 May 2011, in their quest to addressing the changing dynamics in their Mediterranean neighbours, initiated the Money, Mobility and Market (3Ms) agenda as a renewed securitization project to respond to the resulting consequences of the Arab spring which poses a lot of threat to the European space. The EU, in recognizing the post Arab spring difficulties, that are very common among all the North African states, took into consideration giving its support at the individual state level due to prioritization differences, accountability and assessment reasons. The first is Money, where an amount of € 6.9 billion was channelled in 2011 to 2013 to support the Northern Africans. Also in 2011, an amount of € 264 million was used to build facilities for Civil Societies in order to help in championing democratic course. The EU further introduced the Support for Partnership Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme with an amount of €350 million in 2011 and 2012. The aim of the SPRING is to strengthen North African states who are making significant improvement in their democratic transition. Second is the Mobility, where higher education collaborations were made between European countries and North African countries. Third is Market, where strong and sound North African markets will make a progressive transition into the European single market space [14].

### 5. THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE EU SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN NORTH AFRICA

This section is devoted to the impact assessment of the EU's renewed security practices towards North Africa. It discusses the level of impact that ODA and the 3Ms has made to the political, economic and social sphere of the Northern Africa. The full assessment is discussed below:

#### 5.1. Assessment of Political Security

The prime focus of the EU in ensuring political security in the North African region has to do with the inculcation of democratic values such as free and fair elections, independent judiciary, separation of powers, and use of democratic constitution, press freedom etc. Democracy as a system of government has been embraced by countries. As Churchill put it, "democracy is the worst form of government except all the others" [15], [16]. Thus, democracy is the best form of government considering its pros and cons with the other systems of government. This has led to European space in the quest of assisting the North African region, preferred that the North African countries will transit and adopt democratic

principles. However, with regardless of the stand out characteristics of democracy and the renewed securitization processes put in place by the EU to promote a deep rooted transition by the North Africans from their authoritarian regimes, only Tunisia can be said to be successful in its democratic transition. With reference to the 2018 Freedom House report on countries that are in democratic crisis, it was only Tunisia among the North African countries that was able to make an exception with a score of 70 out of 100 ( scale: the higher a country's score, the more free is that country). Also Morocco, who is known to be enjoying a lot of assistance from the EU, by far is recorded to be partly free (with a score of 39 out of 100) in terms of democratic crisis. This do not speak well of Morocco despite the numerous support from the Europeans to them. It explains the reasons why countries like Italy and UK over the past few years have not contributed any ODA support to Morocco, because the Moroccan national government has not shown the political willingness in transiting and adopting democratic values into it fullness. Also, Algeria and Egypt are not exception in facing many challenges in transiting and adopting democratic values. With Algeria scoring 37 out of 100, Egypt also scored 26 out of 100. This explain the argument made by Dandashly [17] that both the political leaders of Algeria and Egypt were not ready to accommodate democracy. The political willingness and desirability was not there for both countries to accept Europeanization as part of their political culture and way of handling their domestic affairs as a sovereign state. Libya scoring the least (9 out of 100) in the North African region is not surprising. This is because the state has never been the same since the commencement of the 2010 Arab unrest. Political unrest de - avail in Libya since the post regime of the late Muammar Gadhafi. Despite the effort made by countries like UK to help Libya out of the unstableness, the state by far, has not been able to hold on to the flagship of peace and stability [18]. This is depicted in figure two (2):




Fig. 2. Democracy in Crisis

Note: F = Free, NF = Not Free and PF= Partially Free.

## 5.2. Assessment of Economic Security

The securitization of the economics sphere of North African region by the EU was an agenda purposely made to improve their trade agreement which will promote economic freedom in the North African region as well as the European accessibility to free trade in general. This led to the EU as part of their renewed security mechanism created the market project with the North African region. This was to better the market accessibility of the partner states and integrate the economies of the partners into the EU single market as the partner states make advancement. This call for the assessment of the economic freedom of individual countries in North Africa in order to understand the impact of the necessary investment and assistance made by the Europeans to support them. With this assessment, it basically focused on the openness of a country to have free market space where states and individuals can buy and sell without many restrictive measures. On a hundred (100) measurement scale, the higher a country's score, the more the country is said to be free in promoting and enhancing economic activities domestically. According to the Heritage Foundation [19] report on economic freedom, Algeria scored 44.7 and took the 172 position out of the 180 countries recorded. This was because Algeria had a significant downturn in its investment freedom and property rights, which in the long run, contribute to the business and monetary freedom as well as the effectiveness of the justice system. The Algerians still hold on to the post-


independence socialist development framework where the country's economy is purely regulated and dominated by the state. With this state dominance, Algeria has been able to restrict foreign participation and involvement in its economic affairs, declined the idea of privatizing state businesses and many other policies that prevent the attraction of both domestic and foreign investors. This together with the political uncertainties in Algeria underrate any future expectation of the state opening up its economic sphere.

Egypt also scored 53.4 and took the 139 position in the world of 180 countries recorded. Egypt, by far, has shown a sign of improvement in its finances, investment and businesses in general. However, less has been done in promoting property rights and the justice system. The government is putting up the necessary measures in place to resurrect the business sphere of the country since their post political turmoil by amalgamating public finance through fiscal policies. The government is also creating a market environment with a limited intervention where the forces of demand and supply will at the end of the day determine the exchange rate. A new phase of the Egyptian development is in their investment policies and the revision on the policies governing bankruptcy [19]. This confirms an assertion made by an expert in an interview conducted that "with a continued mantle of leadership given to Abdel Fattah el- Sisi on March 2018 election, Egyptians are expecting their presidency to put up conducive economic reform and regulatory policies to promote growth and development in the country."

Morocco is the most promising country in North African region in terms of economic freedom according the Heritage Foundation report of 2018. The country scored 61.9 and had the 86th place in the world ranking. It is known to be a country with low labour cost and with a lot of European proximity. The proximity has really helped the Moroccans to have trade on diverse commodification and an orientalisised market economy. The government through the exchange rate regime is trying to promote competition among the non-state enterprises and has also put up fiscal measures to boost development. However, majority of the country's labour force are marginalised as a result of unfavourable labour policies even though the Moroccan King Mohammed VI is concern with it and other restraints that need urgent and deeper reformation.

Tunisia being the next leading state after Morocco scored 58.9 and was ranked 99 among the 180 recorded countries. With Tunisia, there has been a significant improvement of freedom in areas such as investment and trade. However, there is a low working conditions for its labour force due to institutional weakness. Also, reforms that is based on market orientation has been discarded by political parties.

In the case of Libya no records are available. This is due to the political unrest, factional clash and security threats coming from the internal and external corridors. This has really fragile the country's economy and it face difficulties in demobilizing and disarming the militias. Libya will continue to experience such crisis if terminal, recognizable and legitimate government is not put in place to handle its statelessness. This is shown in figure three (3):



Country	Algeria	Egypt	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia
Score	44.7 / 100	53.4 / 100	N / A	61.9 / 100	58.9 / 100
Regional Ranking	14 / 18	11 / 18	-	7 / 18	10 / 18
World Ranking	172 / 180	139 / 180	-	86 / 180	99 / 180

**Fig. 3. The Economic Freedom of North African States.**

Note: N/ A= Not at All.

### 5.3. Assessment of Social Security

The EU through its renewed security engagement towards the North African states prioritized the social safety and wellbeing of the citizens of individual states in the northern region of Africa. This part therefore discuss the impact of the ODA and the 3Ms in promoting social security in North Africa in the post Arab spring era specifically from 2014 to 2017 since that is the available data as at the time of conducting this study. The comparison was made on a measurement scale of zero (0) to hundred (100). The higher the score of a country the high the country is graded as being able to meet the social wellbeing of its citizens.

Since 2014 to 2017, Algeria and Tunisia has been rotating the leadership of the country with the best social wellbeing for its citizens in North African region. The last records (2017) indicated that Tunisia is currently leading with 77.26 over Algeria with 77.09. A country like Morocco from its past relations with the European space through European Neighborhood Policy (EPN), which gives Morocco some favorability till 2020 was expected to be at least be one of the leading states in North Africa in the context of social wellbeing. On the contrary, Morocco has not been able to secure the maximum wellbeing of its citizens compared to Algeria and Tunisia. Since 2016, Morocco has been declining in the promotion of social wellbeing from 73.4 to 73.19 in 2017. Egypt on the other hand has also been noted with a steady rise of 67.66, 67.96 and 69.02 in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively but declined to 68.94 in 2017. Comparably, Egypt is picking up a gradual improvement in the promotion of citizen's social wellbeing.

Libya, has an inverse relation to the trend and part taken by Egypt. Since 2015, Libya has experienced a decreasing return in promoting social good. The country dropped in 2015 (with 66.68) after hitting 65.51 in 2016 and continued to decline to 64.61 in 2017. In an interview conducted, an expert posited that the relevant institution responsible for the promotion of social wellbeing is the state. However due to the statelessness of Libya and considering all other unfavorable factors and occurrences in the country currently, it will be much difficult for Libya to make a significant improvement in the social lives of its citizens. By this Libya is considered to be the least among North African countries when comparing social wellbeing of citizens in the region [21]. This is shown in the figure four (4):




Fig. 4. The Social Wellbeing of North Africa States from 2014 to 2017.



## 6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1. Conclusion

The North Africans face an enormous challenge. Even though the Arab Spring beyond any doubt had a political impulses, it has massively influenced and contributed to economic concerns such as unemployment and underemployment among the youth, lack of quality conditions of service, elite monopolization of the economy, cronyism, economic exclusion and corruption [22]. Sadly, many North African states have enforced restricted reforms and policies, with Tunisia being the foremost booming, as the rest continue to be crawl. This has resulted to several deficits that troubled the region with political, economic and social stagnation. Some international institutions believed that the EU may not be powerful enough in handling the existing realities on the ground, thereby disputing the likelihood of the North African region undergoing the European envisaged transformation. For instance, the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (BCIA) asserted that “the EU may not have the power to transform these realities, but being trapped once again in the illusion of stability in the region is a guarantee of failure” [23]. However, it should be clarified that the study excluded the quest to find rationale behind the opportunity given to Morocco to enjoy some favourability from the ENP from 2014 to 2020, while the other North African states were excluded from such privilege. This is an area that the future research will be considering to find out if the favourability given Morocco through the ENP is a major contributor to the level of securitization that we experience today in Morocco and what is its effect on other North African countries in general.

Furthermore, it has been revealed in this study that the introduction of the ODA and the 3Ms as a renewed securitization mechanism by the EU towards the North Africans in the post Arab spring period, was and has been a significant step in promoting and ensuring security.

### 6.2. Policy Recommendation

For more improvement on the securitization of the North Africa by the EU to be achieved, this section continue to provide some policy recommendation based on expert advice to help promote security in the northern part of Africa. The policy recommendations are as follows:

For the EU to achieve its mission statement with respect to the renewed security engagement towards North Africa, the Union must constantly support the North Africans in their democratic transition by providing and assisting them with all the necessary preconditions that it takes. By this the EU conditionality to the North Africans must be a real political strategy with a continuous effect. Also, there must be a promotion of strong regional integration and cooperation with a fair partnership deals among states and regional actors. The EU development assistants should not only look at the securitization of the political, economics and the social sphere, but must also make provision for the institutionalization of strong military actions with the aim of ensuring constant peace and stability in the region. There must be a strong diplomatic ties among states and regional actors in other to deal with migration crisis and other topical social concerns within the region. Finally, the EU must play a mediating role in managing the ongoing civil unrest in Libya and its surrounding states especially those within the North African region. This will in the long run contribute to the stability and peace that the rest of the world is hoping to see in Libya and in the broader North African region.

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